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ffective regulation of the terms and conditions
of network access,network interconnection and
delivery prices, network investment and network
service quality have been important components of
all successful electricity sector liberalization pro-
grams around the world.The benefits of a good reg-
ulatory framework include lower network service
costs, improvements in service quality, investment to
expand the infrastructure to support changes in the
level and geographic configuration of demand and
generation and the development of good network
platforms to support robust competitive wholesale
and retail markets.
In what follows I will assume that effective electricity
sector restructuring and unbundling mechanisms have
been put in place so that there are clearly defined dis-
tribution and transmission network entities offering
unbundled delivery and network support services to
market participants. I will also assume that electricity
networks are regulated monopolies1 and that an inde-
pendent regulator with adequate staff resources has
been created to oversee the regulation of the distribu-
tion and transmission networks.The paper then focus-
es on the attributes of alternative types of “incentive”
or “performance-based” regulation of distribution and
transmission network price levels and service quality.
Theoretical considerations
The primary goal of regulation in the public interest
is to stimulate the regulated firm to produce output
efficiently in the cost and service quality dimensions,
to price the associated services efficiently,to produce
output to meet demand with adequate levels of reli-
ability and to achieve these goals consistent with sat-
isfying a break-even or budget-balance constraint
for the regulated firm. Much of the traditional liter-
ature on natural monopoly regulation assumes
implicitly that regulators are perfectly informed
about the regulated firm’s cost opportunities and
demand patterns and can effectively enforce cost
minimization on the regulated firm.2 The literature
then focuses on second-best pricing of the services
provided by the regulated firm given defined cost
functions, demand attributes and budget balance
constraints (e.g. Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, non-linear
pricing, etc.).3 The traditional literature has not
focused on incentives to minimize costs or improve
other dimensions of firm performance (e.g. service
quality attributes).
In reality regulators also care about the production
efficiency and service quality implications of the reg-
ulatory mechanisms they choose, and they are nei-
ther completely informed nor completely unin-
formed about relevant cost, quality and demand
attributes faced by the regulated firm. Regulators
have  imperfect information about these firm and
market attributes. Moreover, the regulated firm gen-
erally has more information about these attributes
than does the regulator. Furthermore, managers
have the discretion to make choices not only about
input proportions but also about how hard they will
work to minimize the firm’s costs or with respect to
the levels of service quality.Accordingly,the regulat-
ed firm may use its information advantage (asym-
metric information) strategically to exploit the regu-
latory process to increase its profits or to pursue
other managerial goals, to the disadvantage of con-
sumers (Laffont and Tirole 1993, Chapter 1.) This
creates potential moral hazard (e.g. too little man-
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3 Braeutigam (1989).agerial effort resulting in excessive costs) and
adverse selection (e.g. prices that are too high rela-
tive to production costs), problems that effective
regulatory mechanism design must address. The
recent theoretical literature on incentive regulation
focuses on devising regulatory mechanisms to
respond to these moral hazard and adverse selection
problems (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Armstrong and
Sappington 2005).
Consider a situation in which the regulator is
uncertain about the firm’s true underlying cost and
cost reduction opportunities. The regulator cannot
observe the level of managerial effort expended by
the firm, but the regulator can monitor accurately
the firm’s realized costs ex post.The regulated firm
knows its true cost opportunities, its managerial
effort and the effects of managerial effort on costs.
Following Laffont and Tirole (1993, 10–19), under
these assumptions we can think of two polar case
regulatory mechanisms that might be applied to a
monopoly firm producing a single product with a
fixed quality. The first regulatory mechanism in-
volves setting a fixed price ex ante that the regu-
lated firm will be permitted to charge going for-
ward (i.e. effectively forever). In a dynamic setting
this is equivalent to a pricing formula that starts
with a particular price and then adjusts this price
for exogenous changes in input price indices and
other exogenous indices of cost drivers (again,
effectively forever).This type of regulatory mecha-
nism can be characterized as a fixed price regulato-
ry contract or, in a dynamic setting, a price cap reg-
ulatory mechanism.
Because prices are fixed with this mechanism (or
vary based only on exogenous indices of cost dri-
vers) and do not respond to changes in managerial
effort or ex post cost realizations, the firm and its
managers keep 100 percent of any cost reductions
they realize by increasing effort. Accordingly, and
ignoring service quality and investment considera-
tions for now,this mechanism provides incentives to
induce efficient levels of managerial effort and cost
reduction. However, because the regulator must
ensure that any regulatory mechanism it imposes on
the regulated firm meets a budget balance con-
straint, when the regulator is uncertain about the
regulated firm’s true cost opportunities she will
have to set a relatively high fixed price (or dynamic
price cap) to ensure that if the firm is indeed inher-
ently high cost, the prices under the fixed price con-
tract or price cap will be high enough to cover the
firm’s (efficient but high) realized costs. Accord-
ingly, while a fixed price mechanism does well from
the perspective of providing incentives to reduce
costs, it is potentially very poor at “rent extraction”
for the benefit of consumers and society because
prices may be too high relative to the firm’s true cost
opportunities.
At the other extreme, the regulator could imple-
ment a “cost of service” regulatory contract where
the firm is assured that it will be compensated for all
of the costs of production that it actually incurs and
no more. After the firm produces, the regulator’s
uncertainty about whether the firm is a relatively
high or a low cost opportunity firm will be resolved.
And since the regulator compensates the firm only
for its realized costs, there is no “rent” left to the
firm or its managers in the form of excess profits.
This solves the “rent extraction” or “adverse selec-
tion” problem that would arise under a fixed price
contract. However, this kind of cost of service regu-
latory mechanism does not provide any incentives
for the management to exert optimal (indeed any)
effort.Even though there are no “excess profits”left
to the firm,the actual costs incurred by the firm may
be inefficiently high as a result of too little manage-
rial effort. Managers now retain 0 percent of any
cost savings they achieve and have no incentive to
exert cost-reducing effort. Accordingly, consumers
may now be paying higher prices than they would
have to pay if the management could be induced to
exert more effort to reduce costs. Indeed, it is this
kind of managerial slack and associated x-inefficien-
cies that most policymakers have in mind when they
discuss the “inefficiencies”associated with regulated
firms.
Fixed-price contracts (or price caps) are good at pro-
viding incentives for managerial efficiency and cost
minimization but bad at extracting the benefits of
the lower costs for consumers. Cost of service con-
tracts are good at aligning prices and costs but the
costs will be excessive due to suboptimal managerial
effort. Perhaps not surprisingly, the optimal regula-
tory mechanism in the presence of imperfect and
asymmetric information will lie somewhere between
these two extremes. It will have a form similar to a
profit sharing contract or a sliding scale regulatory
mechanism where the price that the regulated firm
can charge is partially responsive to or contingent on
changes in realized costs and partially fixed ex ante
(Schmalensee 1989; Lyon 1996). More generally, by
offering the regulated firm a menu of cost-contin-
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gent regulatory contracts with different cost sharing
provisions,the regulator can do even better than if it
offers only a single profit sharing contract (Laffont
and Tirole 1993).
Price cap mechanisms in practice
While the theoretical literature on incentive regula-
tion is quite rich, it still provides relatively little
direct guidance for practical application in real-
world circumstances. In practice, well-designed
incentive regulation programs have adopted fairly
simple mechanisms that reflect the basic theoretical
issues discussed above.
A particular form of incentive regulation was intro-
duced for the regulated segments of the privatized
electric gas, telephone and water utilities in the UK,
New Zealand, Australia and portions of Latin
American as well as in the regulated segments of the
telecommunications industry in the US.4 This mech-
anism chosen is the “price cap” (Beesley and Little-
child 1989; Brennan 1989; Armstrong, Cowan and
Vickers 1994; Isaac (1991)). Under price cap regula-
tion the regulator sets an initial price po (or a vector
of prices for multiple products). This price (or a
weighted average of the prices allowed for firms sup-
plying multiple products or different types of cus-
tomers) is then adjusted from one year to the next
for changes in inflation (rate of input price increase
or RPI) and a target productivity change factor “x”.5
Accordingly, the price in period 1 is given by:
p1 = po (1 + RPI – x)
In theory, a “forever” price cap mechanism is a high-
powered “fixed price” regulatory contract that pro-
vides powerful incentives for the firm to reduce
costs. Moreover, if the price cap mechanism is
applied to a (properly) weighted average of the rev-
enues the firm earns from each product it supplies,
the firm has an incentive to set the second-best
prices for each service (Laffont and Tirole 2000)
given the level of the price cap. As already noted,
however, when the regulator has imperfect informa-
tion about the firm’s cost opportunities and must
meet a budget balance constraint, pure “forever”
price cap mechanisms are not optimal from the per-
spective of an appropriate tradeoff between efficien-
cy incentives and rent extraction (Schmalensee
1989) and would leave too much rent to the firm
with “average” cost characteristics. Finally, any
incentive regulation mechanism that provides incen-
tives only for cost reduction also potentially creates
incentives inefficiently to reduce service quality
when service quality and costs are positively related
to one another.
In practice, “forever” price caps are not typically
used in the regulation of distribution and transmis-
sion network price levels. Some form of cost-based
regulation is used to set an initial value for po.T h e
price cap mechanism then operates for a pre-estab-
lished time period (e.g. 5 years). At the end of this
period a new starting price po and a new x factor are
established after another cost-of-service and pru-
dence or efficiency review of the firm’s costs.That is,
there is a pre-scheduled regulatory process to reset
or “ratchet” prices based partially on costs realized
during the previous period. In addition, price caps
are often only one component of a larger portfolio of
incentive mechanisms that include quality of service
incentives, as discussed in the next section. Finally,
regulated electric distribution and transmission net-
work firms’ ability to determine the structure of
prices for different types of customers or for services
provided at different locations on the network under
an overall revenue cap is typically limited. As a
result, price caps are properly thought of as cost and
quality incentive mechanism not as a mechanism to
induce optimal second-best pricing of various net-
work services.
A natural question to ask about price cap mecha-
nisms is where does “x” (and perhaps po) come
from? In England and Wales and some other coun-
tries, statistical benchmarking methods have come
to be used to help to determine the relative effi-
ciency of individual firms’ operating costs and ser-
vice quality compared to their peers.This informa-
tion can then be used as an input to setting values
for both po and x (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001 and
2003; OFGEM 2004a) to provide incentives for
those far from the efficiency frontier to move
toward it and to reward the most efficient firms in
order to induce them to stay on the efficiency fron-
tier.In effect this is an application of yardstick reg-
ulation (Shleifer 1985).
4 The US is behind many other countries in the application of
incentive regulation principles to electric distribution and trans-
mission,though their use is slowly spreading beyond telecommuni-
cations.
5 Many implementations of price cap regulation also have “z” fac-
tors.Z factors reflect cost elements that cannot be controlled by the
regulated firm and are passed through in retail prices.For example,
in the UK, the charges distribution companies pay for connections
to the transmission network are treated as pass-throughs. Changes
in property tax rates are also often treated as pass-throughs.Although it is not discussed too much in the theoret-
ical or empirical literature on price caps,capital-relat-
ed costs are handled quite differently from operating
costs in the establishment and resetting of po and x.
The limited attention paid to capital-related costs in
the academic literature provides a potentially mis-
leading picture of the challenges associated with
implementing a price-cap mechanism effectively.This
is the case for several reasons.First,in practice,the po
and x values must be developed based not only on a
review of the relative efficiency of each firm’s oper-
ating costs, but also based on the value of the firm’s
current capital stock or rate base, forecasts of future
capital additions required to provide target levels of
service quality, and the application of depreciation
rates, estimates of the cost of the firm’s debt and
equity capital, assumptions about the firm’s
dept/equity ratio, tax allowances and other variables
to turn capital stocks into prices for capital services
over time. The capital cost related allowances repre-
sent a large fraction of the total price (po) of supply-
ing unbundled electricity network services so the
choices of these parameters for defining capital user
charges are very important. Second, allowances for
capital-related costs are established through more
traditional utility planning and cost-of-service regula-
tory accounting methods including the specification
of a rate base (or regulatory asset value), deprecia-
tion rates, debt and equity costs, debt/equity ratios,
tax allowances, etc.This is the case because the kinds
of statistical benchmarking techniques that have
been applied to operating costs have not been devel-
oped for capital-related costs, due to significant het-
erogeneity between firms in terms of the age of
assets,geography,service quality,lumpiness of capital
investments and other considerations.Third, the effi-
ciency properties of a regulatory mechanism that
mixes competitive benchmarking with more tradi-
tional forward-looking rate of return regulation are
more complex than first meets the eye (Acemoglu
and Finkelstein 2006). Thus, the implementation of
price cap mechanisms is more complicated than is
often implied and places a significant burden of
information collection,auditing and analysis on regu-
lators. It involves the application of elements of tra-
ditional cost of service regulation, yardstick regula-
tion and high-powered “fixed price” incentives.
The challenge of forecasting future investment needs
and costs for electricity network firms has historical-
ly been a rather contentious process, sometimes
yielding significant differences between what the reg-
ulated firms claim they need and what the regulator
claims they need to meet their legal responsibilities
to provide safe and reliable service efficiently. In the
most recent price review in the UK, the regulator
adopted an innovative approach involving a “menu”
of sliding scale mechanisms to resolve the asymmet-
ric information problem faced by the regulator as she
tries to deal with differences between the firms’
claims and the consultants’ claims (OFGEM 2004b)
about future capital investment requirements to
meet reliability targets.The sliding scale menu allows
firms to choose between getting a lower capital
expenditure allowance but a higher powered incen-
tive (and a higher expected return on investment)
that allows them to retain more of the cost reduction
if they can beat the target expenditure levels or a
higher capital expenditure allowance combined with
a lower powered sliding scale mechanism and lower
expected return (OFGEM 2004b).This is an applica-
tion of Laffont and Tirole’s menu of cost-contingent
contracts mechanism and provides a more effective
way to deal with the imperfect and asymmetric infor-
mation conditions and associated adverse selection
problems than the traditional approach of offering a
single regulatory contract.
An example of the use of profit-sharing or cost-con-
tingent form of incentive regulatory mechanisms can
be found in the incentive mechanism that has been
applied to the costs of the transmission system oper-
ator (SO) in England and Wales, which is also the
transmission owner (TO), though there are separate
regulatory mechanisms for SO and TO functions.
Each year forward targets are established for the
costs of system balancing services and system losses
(OFGEM 2005).A sharing or sliding scale formula is
specified which places the TO at risk for a fraction
(e.g. 30 percent) of deviations from this benchmark
(up or down) with caps on profits and losses.There is
also a cap and a floor. In recent years the SO was
given a menu of three alternative incentive arrange-
ments with different sharing fractions and different
caps and floors (with costs of service as a default)
from which to choose. If the SO were to choose the
cost-of-service default, it would suggest that in con-
structing the menu,the regulator had underestimated
the range of the SO’s future cost realizations.
Service quality incentives
As noted earlier, any incentive regulation mecha-
nism that provides incentives only for cost reduction
also potentially creates incentives to reduce service
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quality when service quality and costs are positively
related to one another.Accordingly, price cap mech-
anisms are increasingly accompanied by a set perfor-
mance standards and associated penalties and
rewards for the firm for falling above or below these
performance norms.Similar mechanisms are used by
several US states and in other countries that have
liberalized their electricity sectors (e.g. New Zea-
land, Netherlands, and Argentina).
In the UK, the regulator (OFGEM) has developed
several incentive mechanisms targeted at various
dimensions of distribution network service quality
(OFGEM 2004b; 2004c). These include: (a) two dis-
tribution service interruption incentive mechanisms
targeted at the number of outages and the number of
minutes per outage, (b) storm interruption payment
obligations targeted at distribution company re-
sponse times to outages caused by severe weather
events, (c) quality of telephone responses during
both ordinary weather conditions and storm condi-
tions,(d) and a discretionary award based on surveys
of customer satisfaction. OFGEM uses statistical
and engineering benchmarking studies and forecasts
of planned maintenance outages to develop targets
for the number of customer outages and the average
number of minutes per outage for each distribution
company.
Until recently in the UK there was no formal incen-
tive mechanism that applied to transmission system
reliability – network failures that lead to administra-
tive customer outages or “unsupplied energy.” In
2005,a new incentive mechanism that focuses on the
reliability of the transmission network as measured
by the quantity of “unsupplied energy” resulting
from transmission network outages went into effect
(OFGEM 2004d). NGC is assessed penalties or re-
ceives rewards when outages fall outside of a “dead-
band” of ± 5 percent defined by the distribution of
historical outage experience (and with potential
adjustments for extreme weather events), using a
sliding scale with a cap and a floor on the revenue
impact.
Performance attributes
Incentive regulation has been promoted as a
straightforward and superior alternative to tradition-
al cost of service or rate of return regulation.In prac-
tice, incentive regulation is more a complement to
than a substitute for traditional approaches to regu-
lating network monopolies. In some ways it is more
challenging.Incentive regulation in practice requires
a good accounting system for capital and operating
costs, cost reporting protocols, data collection and
reporting requirements for dimensions of perfor-
mance other than costs.Capital cost accounting rules
are necessary, a rate base for capital must still be
defined, depreciation rates specified and an allowed
rate of return on capital determined.Comprehensive
“rate cases” or “price reviews” are still required to
implement “simple” price cap mechanisms. Planning
processes for determining needed capital additions
are an important part of the process of setting total
allowed revenues going forward. Performance
benchmarks must be defined and the power of the
relevant incentive mechanisms determined.
The information burden to implement incentive reg-
ulation mechanisms well is certainly no less than for
traditional costs of service regulation. What distin-
guishes incentive regulation in practice from tradi-
tional costs of service regulation is that this informa-
tion is used more effectively. Whether the extra
effort is worth it depends on whether the perfor-
mance improvements justify the additional effort.
Unfortunately, there has been relatively little sys-
tematic analysis of the effects of the application of
incentive regulation mechanisms on the perfor-
mance of electric distribution and transmission com-
panies.6 Improvements in labor productivity and ser-
vice quality have been documented for electric dis-
tribution systems in England and Wales, Argentina,
Chile,Brazil,Peru,New Zealand and other countries
(Newbery and Pollitt 1997; Rudnick and Zolezzi
2001; Bacon and Besant-Jones 2001; Estache and
Rodriguez-Pardina 1998; Pollitt 2004). However,
most of these studies have focused on developing
countries where the pre-reform levels of perfor-
mance were especially poor prior to restructuring.
Moreover, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of
privatization, restructuring and incentive regulation
from one another.
The most comprehensive study of the post-reform
performance of the regional electricity distribution
companies in the UK (distribution and supply func-
tions) has been done by Domah and Pollitt (2001).
They found significant overall increases in produc-
tivity over the period 1990 to 2000 and lower real
6 There is a much more extensive body of empirical work that
examines the effects of incentive regulation mechanisms, primarily
price caps, on the performance of telecommunications firms.“controllable” distribution costs compared to a
number of benchmarks.However,controllable costs
and overall prices first rose in the early years of the
reforms before falling dramatically after 1995 and
the first application of price cap mechanisms to the
distribution networks in 1990 was too generous
(average of RPI + 2.5 percent) and a lot of rent was
initially left on the table for the RECs’ initial own-
ers (who cleverly soon sold out to foreign buyers).
Distribution service quality in the UK, at least as
measured by supply interruptions per 100 customers
and average minutes of service lost per customer,
has improved as well in the UK since the restructur-
ing and privatization initiative in 1990.This suggests
that incentive regulation has not led, as some had
feared, to deterioration in these dimensions of ser-
vice quality.
The experience with the transmission system operator
(SO) incentive mechanism in England and Wales also
provides a good example of how incentive regulation
can improve performance. During the first few years
following the restructuring of the electricity sector in
England and Wales in 1990, the SO recovered the
costs of system balancing,including managing conges-
tion and other network constraints through a simple
cost pass-through mechanism.The SO’s costs escalat-
ed rapidly,growing from about $75 million per year in
1990/91 to almost $400 million per year in 1993/94.
After the introduction of the SO incentive scheme in
1994, these costs fell to about $25 million in
1999/2000. OFGEM estimates that NGC’s system
operating costs fell by about £400 million between
1994 and 2001.A new SO incentive scheme was intro-
duced when NETA went into operation in early 2001.
The SO’s costs have fallen by nearly 20 percent over
the three year period since the new scheme was intro-
duced (OFGEM 2003).
While more work needs to be done on the perfor-
mance of incentive regulation mechanisms applied
to electric distribution and transmission systems, the
experience so far is very encouraging.
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